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NOTES
STATE COURT JURISDICTION FOUNDED ON
TERRITORIAL POWER DENIES DUE PROCESS
TO NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANTS-
SHAFFER V. HEITNER
In rein I and quasi-in rem 2 jurisdiction traditionally were founded
upon the state's physical power over property located within its ter-
ritorial boundaries.3 Even when a state court was unable to obtain
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, it could acquire
the power to adjudicate his interests in property found within the
forum merely by attaching it,4 with liability extending only to the
value of such property. 5 In Shaffer v. Heitner,6 the United States
Supreme Court held that jurisdiction based solely upon a state's ter-
ritorial power over property violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The Court concluded that such jurisdic-
tion is not "'judicial jurisdiction over a thing';"8 it is "jurisdiction
1. In the strict sense of the term, a proceeding in rem is one which is taken directly
against property or one which is brought to enforce a right in the thing itself. In the more
general sense, however, the term is applied to actions between parties where the direct object
of the litigation is to resolve the conflicting interests of the parties in the property. See BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 900 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. In a quasi-in rem proceeding, only the interest of the defendant in the property is
affected. The plaintiff does not claim any interest in the property. Instead, he seeks to enforce a
claim against the defendant personally by applying the property of the defendant to the satisfac-
tion of his claim, through attachment or garnishment of such property. To sustain quasi-in rem
jurisdiction, the defendant's property need only be located within the forum, and it does not
have to be related to the plaintiff's cause of action. A. SCOTT & R. KENT, CASES AND OTHER
MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 417-18 (1967). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 900-01 (rev.
4th ed. 1968).
3. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
4. Notice must conform to the due process requirements set forth in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See note 16 infra.
5. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 32 (1942) provides: "A court by proper service of pro-
cess may acquire jurisdiction to determine interests in things within the State, even though the
persons affected thereby are not subject to the power of the State." See generally RESTATE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 33-37, 73-76 (1942).
6. 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
inunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
8. 97 S. Ct. at 2581. See Introductory Note to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 56 (1971).
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over the interests of persons in a thing." 9 The standard to be applied
when determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the inter-
ests of persons was consistent with due process requirements, the
Court held, is the "minimum contacts" rule developed in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington. 10
This Note will explore the impact of the Shaffer decision on the
law of jurisdiction. It will trace and discuss the development of the
concept of territorial jurisdiction and examine the changes made by
the Shaffer holding in the existing law. The Note will then explore
the effect of the decision on the ability of state courts to secure juris-
diction over non-resident defendants. Finally, it will analyze weak-
nesses in the opinion which may present interpretive problems for
the lower courts.
THE FACTS OF Shaffer
Shaffer v. Heitner was a shareholder's derivative suit." Heitner, a
non-resident of Delaware, owned one share of stock in the
Greyhound Corporation, a business incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in Arizona. He filed the action in Dela-
ware, naming Greyhound and twenty eight of its officers and direc-
tors as defendants, and alleging mismanagement on the part of the
individual defendants.12 The Delaware trial court asserted jurisdic-
tion over twenty-one of the individual defendants, all non-residents,
by sequestering their property in the state in accordance with a Del-
9. 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, a Delaware corporation was sued in a
Washington state court for unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund.
From 1937 to 1940, the corporation had salesmen in Washington who were only authorized to
exhibit samples and solicit orders. The orders were filled by mail directly from the home office.
The corporation, however, maintained no office in the state. The Supreme Court did away with
the physical presence requirements of Pennoyer, holding that "due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the terri-
tory of the forum, he must have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'." Id. at 316.
11. A derivative suit is an action by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action.
The corporation is a necessary party, and the relief sought is a judgment against third parties (in
Shaffer, the defendant officers and directors) in favor of the corporation. BLACK'S LAW DiC-
TIONARY 530 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
12. The Greyhound Corporation was found to be liable in a private antitrust suit, and a
judgment of $13,146,090 plus attorneys fees had been entered against it. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc.
v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977). The corporation and its subsidiary,
Greyhound Lines, Inc., were also fined a total of $600,000 in a criminal contempt action.
United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. II1.), 370 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill.
1973), affd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974). Heitner alleged that these losses were the result of
mismanagement by the corporate officers and directors named as defendants.
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aware statute. 13  Under this statute, Delaware courts could compel
the appearance of a non-resident defendant by seizing his property
and, if the defendant did not appear, his property could be sold to
satisfy the demands of the plaintiff.14 The property sequestered con-
sisted of 82,000 shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to
nineteen of the defendants, and stock options owned by two other
defendants. Although none of the stock certificates representing the
sequestered property were physically located in Delaware, they were
considered to be in the state under a Delaware statute 15 which makes
Delaware the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations.
The non-resident defendants were properly notified of the action, 16
and each entered a special appearance, moving to quash service of
13. To acquire jurisdiction, Heitner was required under DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974) to
file a motion, simultaneously with the filing of his complaint, for the sequestration of the Dela-
ware property of the individual non-resident defendants. He complied with the statutory re-
quirements, and a sequestration order was issued by the Court of Chancery. 97 S. Ct. at 2573.
The pertinent parts of the statute at issue, section 366, provide:
(a) If it appears in any complaint filed in the Court of Chancery that the defen-
dant or any one or more of the defendants is a nonresident of the State, the Court
may make an order directing such nonresident defendant or defendants to appear
by a day certain to be designated. Such order shall be served on such nonresident
defendant or defendants by mail or otherwise, if practicable, and shall be published
in such manner as the Court directs, not less than once a week for 3 consecutive
weeks. The Court may compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure of all
or any part of his property, which property may be sold under the order of the
Court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or
otherwise defaults. Any defendant whose property shall have been so seized and
who shall have entered a general appearance in the cause may, upon notice to the
plaintiff, petition the Court for an order releasing such property or any part thereof
from the seizure. The Court shall release such property unless the plaintiff shall
satisfy the Court that because of other circumstances there is a reasonable possibil-
ity that such release may render it substantially less likely that plaintiff will obtain
satisfaction of any judgment secured. If such petition shall not be granted, or if no
such petition shall be filed, such property shall remain subject to seizure and may
be sold to satisfy any judgment entered in the cause. The Court may at any time
release such property or any part thereof upon the giving of sufficient security.
(b) The Court may make all necessary rules respecting the form of process, the
manner of issuance and return thereof, the release of such property from seizure
and for the sale of the property so seized, and may require the plaintiff to give
approved security to abide any order of the Court respecting the property.
DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (a),(b) (1974).
14. Id. § 366 (a).
15. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974). The statute provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all
courts held in this State, but not for the purpose of taxation, the situs of the owner-
ship of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this State,
whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this
State.
16. In actions involving property, where in rein or quasi-in rem jurisdiction is being exer-
cised, the method of service used must, if due process is to be satisfied, conform to the stan-
dards set forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Notice
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process. They contended that the sequestration procedure did not
afford them due process and that they did not have sufficient contacts
with Delaware to sustain state court jurisdiction under the minimum
contacts rule of International Shoe. 17 The Court of Chancery dis-
missed the appellants' arguments, holding that the purpose of the
sequestration procedure was "to compel the personal appearance of a
nonresident defendant to answer and defend a suit brought against
him .... "18 The court further noted that due process was not of-
fended because, "if the defendant enters a general appearance, the
sequestered property is routinely released." 19 Additionally, it held
that the statutory situs of the stock in Delaware provided a sufficient
basis for the exercise of quasi-in rem jurisdiction.2"
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, 21 holding
that the appellants' contention that the minimum contacts rule of In-
ternational Shoe should have been applied was erroneous. The court
reasoned that jurisdiction in this case was "quasi-in rem founded on
the presence of capital stock here, not on prior contact by defendants
with this forum." 22
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 23 It noted that the
categorical analysis of the jurisdiction issue by the Delaware Supreme
Court assumed "the continued soundness of the conceptual structure
founded on the century-old case of Pennoyer v. Neff." 24 This concept
of jurisdiction based entirely on territorial power, the Court con-
cluded, is offensive to "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 1d. at 314.
In the present case, the defendants were notified of the initiation of the suit and the sequestra-
tion of their property by certified mail directed to their last known addresses and by publication
in a New Castle County (Delaware) newspaper. 97 S. Ct. at 2574.
17. 97 S. Ct. at 2574.
18. Id. This holding was made in an unreported Delaware Court of Chancery letter opinion.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2575.
21. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
22. Id. at 229. It should be noted that U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D.
Del. 1972), a case that the Delaware Supreme Court cited as one strongly in support of its
affirmance of jurisdiction, was subsequently reversed in U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d
142 (3d Cir. 1976).
23. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
24. Id. at 2576. The conceptual structure of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), consisted
of two premises. First, a state court could not exercise jurisdiction over a party physically
beyond its territorial boundaries, a premise that was altered substantially by the holding of
International Shoe. Second, if a defendant owned property within the forum, the state could
exercise its exclusive authority over things within its borders to condemn such property to
satisfy a plaintiff's claim. 95 U.S. at 719-36. See COOK, THE LOCICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 51-52 (1942); Zammit, Quasi-In Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Un-
constitutional?, 49 ST.-JOHN'S L. REV. 668, 670-71 (1975).
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justice," 25 and "its continued acceptance would serve only to allow
state court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defen-
dant." 26
THE EFFECT OF Shaffer ON PRIOR CASE LAW
The theory that judicial authority could be exercised over property
without being exercised over the property owner became part of the
law of jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff, 27 where the Court held that a
state's authority to adjudicate controversies could be based on its
power over either persons or property found within its borders. 28
Although the property supporting the exercise of jurisdiction in an in
rem or quasi-in rem proceeding could be condemned to satisfy a
judgment for the plaintiff,29 the non-resident property owner was
thought to be only indirectly affected. 30 Furthermore, the Court
held that, in a quasi-in rem action, the property attached to secure
jurisdiction did not have to be related to the cause of action. Jurisdic-
tion could be based solely on the fortuitous circumstance that the
defendant owned unrelated property in the forum. 31
The concept of quasi-in rem jurisdiction was expanded significantly
by the decision in Harris v. Balk. 32  In that case, the Court held that
25. 97 S. Ct. at 2584, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945).
26. 97 S. Ct. at 2584.
27. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Neff, a non-resident of Oregon, was sued in that state by one
Mitchell to recover attorney's fees. Notice of the suit had been given by newspaper publication
rather than personal service and, after a default judgment was entered, Neff's Oregon property
was sold to satisfy the judgment. The issue before the Supreme Court was the validity of the
execution sale to Pennoyer and of the judgment it sought to enforce.
The Court found that the personal judgment entered by the Oregon court against Neff on the
fees was invalid and, hence, did not authorize the sale of his property. Id. at 734. The first
action was an in personam suit, yet the Oregon court had never obtained jurisdiction over Neff.
The Court held that Mitchell should have first secured the attachment of non-resident Neff's
Oregon property, thus effecting a proceeding in the nature of in rein rather than in personam.
Had the in rem action been perfected, service by publication would have been adequate. Id. at
727.
28. When jurisdiction was founded on property, the effect of the judgment was limited to
the property that supported jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). See Zam-
mit, supra note 24, at 669, 670 n. 12. See also Cook, supra note 24, at 51-52.
29. Zamrnit, supra note 24, at 670.
30. 97 S. Ct. at 2577-78. See Pennover v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1877).
31. It is in this context that jurisdiction based on property can be particularly unreasonable.
The defendant, who may have had no related contact with the forum, can be forced to choose
between making a general appearance (exposing himself to possible personal liability) or risking
the loss of his property in a default judgment. See Note, Quasi-ln Rein Jurisdiction & Due
Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J. 1023, 1024-25 (1973). See also Zammit, supra note 24, at
670-71, 677.
32. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Harris was a North Carolina resident who owed Balk, also a North
Carolina resident, $180. Balk was indebted to a third party, Epstein. While Harris was ten-
1977]
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the presence of intangible property owned by the defendant in the
forum provided a sufficient basis for the exercise of quasi-in rem
jurisdiction. 33 Under the reasoning of Harris, a defendant, although
he had no physical contact with the forum state, could lose his inter-
est in his intangible property if the situs of such property was deter-
mined to be in the forum. Difficulties in ascertaining the situs of such
intangible property led to the development of complex legal fictions 34
and illogical statutory declarations.35
Subsequent decisions continued to recognize that in personam
jurisdiction differed from jurisdiction founded on territorial power. In
Pennington v. Fourth National Bank,36 jurisdiction based on the at-
porarily in Maryland, Epstein served him with a writ of attachment garnishing his debt to Balk.
A default judgment was then entered against Balk, and Harris, pursuant to the judgment, paid
the money to Epstein. When Balk later sued Harris in North Carolina to recover the $180,
Harris pleaded in defense his payment to Epstein under the garnishment in Maryland. The
North Carolina court held the Maryland judgment invalid, finding that the debt had been im-
properly attached because the situs of the debt Harris owed to Balk was in North Carolina
where Harris resided, and not in Maryland where he was garnished. The Supreme Court re-
versed the North Carolina judgment and held that the debt had been properly impounded. Id.
at 226.
33. In Shaffer, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the statutory situs of the defend-
ants' stock in Delaware provided the basis for quasi-in rein jurisdiction. 97 S. Ct. at 2575.
34. See Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917) (proceeds of a bank account
construed to be a debt owed by the resident bank to the non-resident defendant); Atkinson v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958) (in a suit
by plaintiff musicians to invalidate a collective bargaining agreement which provided for the
payment by employers of royalties to a non-resident defendant trustee, the court held that
payments owed by the employer, either to the defendant or the plaintiffs, constituted property
within the state sufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,
269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966) (insurance policy issued to a non-resident defendant by
a foreign insurance company, pursuant to a contract entered into in another state, could be
attached for jurisdictional purposes by a New York plaintiff because the insurance company did
business in New York). See also Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV.
655 (1959).
35. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974) is a good example. The situs of ownership of all stock in
Delaware corporations is declared to be in Delaware, although the physical presence of the
stock certificates may be known to be outside of the state, and the incidences of ownership over
the stock have been exercised elsewhere. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-322 (Supp. 1971);
S.C. CODE § 12-13.7 (Supp. 1970). But see U.C.C. § 8-317(1) (1972 ed.) (situs governed by the
location of the stock certificate).
36. 243 U.S. 269 (1917). Mrs. Pennington obtained a divorce in an Ohio court from the
plaintiff, who was not an Ohio resident. Mr. Pennington was served by publication only. In the
same proceeding, Mrs. Pennington sought and was granted alimony. To insure its payment, she
joined the Fourth National Bank of Cincinnati, where the plaintiff had a deposit account, as a
defendant. The bank was eventually ordered by the court to pay the balance of the account to
her. When the plaintiff later presented a check to the bank for the amount of his deposit, the
bank refused payment. He then brought an action against the bank, claiming that because he
was a non-resident and had been served only by publication, the Ohio court's oider deprived
him of his property without due process of law. The Supreme Court upheld the Ohio court's
action, holding that the bank deposit was seized in a quasi-in rem proceeding: "Indebtedness
due from a resident to a non-residet-of which bank deposits are an example-is property
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tachment of a non-resident defendant's bank account was sustained.
"The Fourteenth Amendment," the Court held, "did not, in guaran-
teeing due process of law, abridge the jurisdiction which a state pos-
sessed over property within its borders, regardless of the residence or
presence of the owner." 37 The New York Court of Appeals, in Seider
v. Roth,3 8 upheld a quasi-in rem judgment against a Canadian
defendant where jurisdiction was based solely on the fact that the
defendant was contractually entitled to be defended by his insurer, a
company that did business in New York. This contractual obligation
was construed to be a debt located within the forum which had been
properly attached. 39 Thus, the court concluded, the judgment was
valid up to the limits of the policy coverage. 40
The Shaffer decision substantially overruled Pennoyer v. Neff,
Harris v. Balk, and their progeny. 4' The Supreme Court rejected
the theory that jurisdiction based solely on the existence of property
is consistent with due process, concluding that it would be a fiction to
hold that an assertion of jurisdiction over property- was anything but
an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of that property.42  "'Judi-
cial jurisdiction over a thing,'" it stated, is an "elliptical way of refer-
ring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." 43 The
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over property must, therefore, be
sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over personal interests.
within the State." Id. at 271. Since the plaintiff's property was properly attached, the Court
concluded, and the method of service used provided him with an opportunity to be heard, the
order of the Ohio court was valid. Id. at 272.
37, 1d. at 271. The Court held that such jurisdiction extended to both tangible and intangi-
ble property. The only essentials to the exercise of the State's power, it concluded, were the
presence of the res within its borders, its seizure at the commencement of proceedings, and
some provision for an opportunity for the property owner to be heard. Id. at 272.
38. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966). The Seiders were residents of
New York. While in Vermont, they were injured in an automobile accident involving one
Lemiux, a Canadian citizen and resident. Lemiux was insured under an automobile liability
policy, issued by a company that did business in New York, which required the insurer to
defend its insured in any automobile negligence actions. Although personal jurisdiction could
not be obtained over Lemiux, quasi-in rem jurisdiction was exercised by the New York court
through the attachment of the insurer's obligation to defend him.
39. As soon as the accident occurred, the court held, there was imposed upon the insurer a
contractual obligation that must be considered a debt owing to the insured, which was subject
to attachment. Id. at 113, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101, 216 N.E.2d at 315.
40. Id. at 114, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102, 216 N.E.2d at 315.
41. It would not be fruitful for us to re-examine the facts of cases decided on the
rationales of Pennoyer and Harris to determine whether jurisdiction might have
been sustained under the standard we adopt today. To the extent that prior deci-
sions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled.
97 S. Ct. at 2585 n.39.
42. Id. at 2584.
43, Id. at 2581.
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The standard for ascertaining whether an assertion of jurisdiction over
the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause
must be the "minimum contacts" test set forth in International
Shoe. 44
The position adopted by the Court has been urged by commen-
tators and lower court decisions for some time. 45 Justice Traynor
believed that realistic tests were needed to determine jurisdiction,
stressing that "justice is ill served by mechanical ones." 46 He felt
courts could not evaluate the real factors that determine jurisdiction
until they gave up "the ghost of the res." 4 7 In Simpson v.
Loehmann,4" the New York Court of Appeals noted:
The historical limitations on both in personam and in rem jurisdic-
tion, with their rigid tests, are giving way to a more realistic and
reasonable evaluation of the respective rights of plaintiffs, defend-
ants and the State in terms of fairness. Such an evaluation requires
a practical appraisal of the situation of the various parties rather
than an emphasis upon somewhat magical and medieval concepts of
presence and power.49
In Minichiello v. Rosenberg,50 the Second Circuit held that the selec-
tion of a situs for intangibles must embody a common sense appraisal
of the requirements of justice and convenience to the parties. 51
Commentators, the court noted, have considered Harris v. Balk 52 to
be an "anachronism." 5 3
44. Id. at 2581-82. International Shoe stands for the proposition that, to be consistent with
due process, a non-resident defendant cannot be subjected to a judgment unless he has had
certain minimum contacts with the forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'." 326 U.S. at 316. Whether it is reason-
able to subject a non-resident defendant to jurisdiction cannot be resolved by mechanical or
quantitative evaluations of his activities in the forum. Instead, "whether due process is satisfied
must depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the Due Process Clause to insure." Id. at
319.
45. U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976); Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank,
530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976); COOK, supra note 24; Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Hazard,
A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 S. CT. REV. 241, 281-88 (1965); Traynor,
supra note 34; Zammit, supra note 24; Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
HARv. L. REV. 909, 955-66 (1960).
46. Traynor, supra note 34, at 663.
47. Id.
48. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 234 N.E.2d 669 (1967).
49. Id. at 311, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637, 234 N.E.2d at 672.
50. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
51. Id. at 110-11.
52. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
53. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 120 n.1 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
844 (1969). See also Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOrHN's L. REV. 58,
65, 66 (1968).
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The fact that the concept of state court jurisdiction based on ter-
ritorial power had long been supported by established case law, the
Court recognized, could not be decisive. "Traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice," it stated, "can be as readily offended by
the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by
the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic
values of our constitutional heritage." 54 Continued acceptance of the
proposition that jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property
is consistent with due process, it was felt, would only perpetuate
state court jurisdiction which has proved to be unfair to the defen-
dant. 55
The Court also took the opportunity to clarify the meaning of Han-
son v. Denckla.56  Because of certain language in that case, 57 com-
mentators considered the decision to be a modern, although limited,
reaffirmation of the concept of territorial jurisdiction expressed in
Pennoyer.5 8  Reading Hanson broadly, the Court concluded that
nothing in the opinion was contrary to International Shoe,59 and that
the holding contained no "sweeping endorsements of jurisdiction
based on property:"
In Hanson v. Denckla, ... we noted that a State court's in rem
jurisdiction is '(f)ounded on physical power' and that '(t)he basis of
the jurisdiction is the presence of the subject property within the
54. 97 S. Ct. at 2584, citing Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
55. 97 S. Ct. at 2584.
56. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The action involved the settlement in a Florida court of an estate
which included a trust fund established in Delaware. The decedent was a Pennsylvania
domiciliary at the time she created the trust and named a Delaware corporation as trustee. She
later moved to Florida, where she resided at her death. The Supreme Court concluded that the
Florida court settling the estate had not obtained personal jurisdiction over the trustee because
the trustee did not have sufficient "minimum contacts" with Florida to be amenable to personal
jurisdiction.
57. While discussing International Shoe, the Court in Hanson noted:
But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. . . . Those restrictions are
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are
a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.
Id. at 251.
58. See Zammit, supra note 24, at 677. Citing Hanson, the author states "unfortunately, the
court has refused to abandon completely the theory of territoriality." Id. See also U.S. Indus.,
Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 1976), where the court cites Hanson as supporting
the theory of state court jurisdiction over property within its control, regardless of the presence
or absence of other contacts with the forum. Id. n.20.
59. The Court, referring to International Shoe, commented:
Nothing in Hanson v. Denckla is to the contrary. The Hanson Court's statement
that restrictions on state jurisdiction 'are a consequence of territorial limitations on
the power of the respective States,' . . . simply makes the point that the States are
defined by their geographical territory.
97 S. Ct. at 2580 n.20.
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territorial jurisdiction of the forum State.' We found in that case,
however, that the property which was the basis for the assertion of
in rem jurisdiction was not present in the State. We therefore did
not have to consider whether the presence of property in the State
was sufficient to justify jurisdiction. We also held that the defend-
ant did not have sufficient contact with the State to justify in per-
sonam jurisdiction .60
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE "MINIMUM CONTACTS" STANDARD
Prior to Shaffer, the Supreme Court had never considered the due
process issues raised by the appellants. The principal cases in which
the Court had sustained the use of attachment procedures by state
courts to acquire jurisdiction 61 had been decided prior to Interna-
tional Shoe, where due process limitations on jurisdiction over non-
residents were significantly redefined. 62 When presented with an
opportunity to correct what had become an anomaly in the area of
jurisdictional law, the Court acted. It rejected the theory of jurisdic-
tion based on property or territorial power and adopted the minimum
contacts rule of International Shoe as the only standard for deter-
mining the validity of state court jurisdiction over non-residents.
The International Shoe standard places two limitations on the scope
of state judicial power. 63 First, the state's interest in permitting the
initiation of the suit must be adequate to satisfy the demands of
federalism. 64  Because due process prohibits a state from exercising
its judicial authority in a manner that would infringe on the
sovereignty of a sister state, 65 any state, before it can properly ad-
judicate a suit involving non-resident defendants, must have a recog-
nizable interest that is rationally connected to its public policy. 66
The second limitation is concerned with the parties to the litigation,
focusing on the burdens involved with litigating in a particular
forum. 67 To satisfy due process, "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" must be considered by the court seeking to exer-
60. Id. at 2584 n.38.
61. Ownbey v. Mkorgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269
(1917); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
62. See Zammit, supra note 24, at 673-74; Note, Quasi-In Rem Jurisdiction & Due Process
Requirements, supra note 31, at 1031-32.
63. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1945); Jonnet v. Dollar
Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1140 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
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cise jurisdiction. 68  When such an exercise of jurisdiction would be
exceedingly unfair or burdensome to a defendant, due process re-
quires that it not be sustained, regardless of the substantiality of the
state's interest in the litigation.
When applied, these restrictions work in conjunction with one
another, interacting to form a balanced standard for ascertaining the
validity of state court jurisdiction.6 9 The court attempting to assert
jurisdiction must consider the relationship between the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation. 70 The contacts of the parties to the
controversy are to be analyzed qualitatively. 71  Ordinarily, the nature
of the defendant's relationship to the forum will become the relevant
inquiry. 72  If the state's interests in the outcome of the litigation are
very strong, however, jurisdiction can be sustained even when the
defendant's contacts with the forum are slight. 73  In such situations,
it would be unusual for another state to have a significant interest in
the litigation. Under these circumstances, subjecting a non-resident
defendant who has had minimal contacts with the forum to jurisdic-
tion would not be unreasonable.
The minimum contacts test has as its goal a result that is reasonable
and fair to the parties involved. 74 Unlike the territorial approach
to jurisdiction, the minimum contacts rule does not require the de-
velopment of legal fictions or the creation of illogical statutory au-
68. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
69. Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1140 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concur-
ring). See also Traynor, supra note 34, at 661.
70. 97 S. Ct. at 2580.
71. "'Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of
the activity .. " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). See Jonnet
v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1140, 1142 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
72. 97 S. Ct. at 2580. See Zammit, supra note 24, at 673-74; see generally Hazard, supra
note 45, at 275-81.
73. The term "'minimum contacts" is somewhat ambiguous. A non-resident defendant is not
required to have had a certain number of contacts with the forum before jurisdiction can be
validly exercised over him. In International Shoe, the Court specifically noted that quantitative
evaluations of the defendant's activities in the forum could not resolve the question of reason-
ableness. 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
The Court held in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), that a single
act within the state seeking jurisdiction would be sufficient contact if it gave rise to the cause of
action. In that case, the only contact the defendant had with the forum was the mailing of one
insurance policy to the resident plaintiff. The Court commented that a state has a substantial
interest in providing an adequate means of redress for its citizens who were injured, and very
often the place where the wrong occurs is the most convenient place of litigation. 355 U.S. at
223. Accord, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 1ll.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
74. See Traynor, supra note 34, at 661; see also Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules:
A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600, 614-29 (1977).
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thority75 to justify its application. In rem jurisdiction is based solely
on the existence of property within the state, without regard to the
relationship of the defendant to the forum. Quasi-in rem jurisdiction
must rely on standards which, because they are often left to the
courts of the individual states to define, can vary significantly. 76 Only
a minimum contacts analysis can reasonably insure that due process
will be satisfied when jurisdiction is asserted over non-resident de-
fendants. 77
WEAKNESSES IN THE Shaffer OPINION
As Justice Brennan indicates in his separate opinion, the Shaffer
holding "fundamentally alters the relevant jurisdictional ground
rules." 7 Each assertion of state court jurisdiction must now be
evaluated in accordance with the standards developed in Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny. 79 This does not mean, however, that
jurisdiction cannot be sustained when property located within the
forum is the non-resident's only contact with the forum. The Court
pointed out that "jurisdiction over many types of actions which now
are or might be brought in rein would not be affected by a holding
that any assertion of state court jurisdiction must satisfy the Interna-
tional Shoe standard," 80 noting that when claims to the property it-
self are the basis for the controversy between the parties, "it
would be unusual for the state where the property is located not to
have jurisdiction."'8 In such situations, the dual limitations of Inter-
75. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
76. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950).
77. Justice Traynor recognized this fact, noting that as long as courts continue to ask "res,
res-who's got the res?, they cripple their evaluation of the real factors that should determine
jurisdiction." Traynor, supra note 34, at 663. See also Zammit, supra note 24, at 673-74; De-
velopments, supra note 45, at 960-66.
78. 97 S. Ct. at 2589 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
79. Id. at 2584-85.
80. Id. at 2582. See Smit, supra note 74, at 614-26; Traynor, supra note 34, at 660-61.
81. 97 S. Ct. at 2582. The Court illustrates this contention by noting the factors that would
be likely to sustain jurisdiction under the International Shoe standard:
In such cases, the defendant's claim to property located in the State would normally
indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protection of his interest. The
State's strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its borders
and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes about the posses-
sion of that property would also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that
important records and witnesses will be found in the State. The presence of prop-
erty may also favor jurisdiction in cases such as suits for injury suffered on the land
of an absentee owner, where the defendant's ownership of the property is conceded




national Shoe would apparently be satisfied. The state would clearly
have a significant interest, based on public policy considerations, to
adjudicate the controversy. In addition, since the interests of the par-
ties in the property are the source of the litigation, it would not ordi-
narily be palpably unfair to require the defendant to appear in the
forum where that property is located.
Although the majority opinion implies that in rem jurisdiction will
continue to exist in reality, it is not completely clear on the subject.
In their concurring opinions, Justice Powell and Justice Stevens show
concern for this question. Both urge that this decision should not be
read as invalidating traditional in rem jurisdiction, at least where real
property is involved, 82
The Shaffer opinion is very definite as to the future applicability of
quasi-in rem jurisdiction. In cases where the property that currently
serves as the basis for state court jurisdiction is completely unrelated
to the plaintiff's cause of action, those cases cannot be brought in that
forum if other ties do not exist. 83 In these situations, the "minimum
contacts" test of International Shoe is to be applied by the state
court, 84 and the "quality and nature" of the non-resident defendant's
contacts with his property in the forum must be evaluated.8 5 The
Shaffer opinion, however, does not specify the criteria that the lower
courts are to apply when making this qualitative analysis. Previously,
jurisdiction in cases of this nature was based on the concept of ter-
ritorial power, so there was no need to evaluate the defendant's con-
tacts with the forum. Consequently, standards for determining the
"quality and nature" of these contacts have not been developed.
Although in their separate opinions Justice Powell 86 and Justice
Stevens 87 both express concern over this lack of standards, Justice
Brennan goes into the problem in more depth.88 A comparison of
his opinion and that of the majority clearly illustrates this problem
82. Id. at 2587 (Powell, J., concurring), 2587-88 (Stevens, J., concurring). See Zammit,
supra note 24, at 673-75.
83. 97 S. Ct. at 2582-83.
84. Id. at 2584-85.
85. rd. at 2582, citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
86. Justice Powell contends that "in the case of real property, in particular, preservation of
the common law concept of quasi-in rem jurisdiction arguably would avoid the uncertainty of
the general International Shoe standard .. " 97 S. Ct. at 2587 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Justice Stevens concurred in tie decision as it was applied to the particular facts of the
case, but he noted that "'how the Court's opinion may be applied in other contexts is not
entirely clear." Id. at 2588 (Stevens, J., concurring).
88. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). He also notes that the lower courts based
jurisdiction on a jurisdictional predicate (quasi-in rein) presumed to be constitutionally valid at
the time the case was decided, and that the issue of minimum contacts "was never pleaded by
the appellee, made the subject of discovery, or ruled upon by the Delaware Courts." Id.
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with the lack of firm criteria. In reaching the conclusion that the ap-
pellants did not have the requisite minimum contacts to sustain the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Delaware courts, the majority relied
primarily on two factors. First, the appellants had never been in Del-
aware and no act related to the cause of action was alleged to have
taken place in the forum.8 9 Second, although the sequestration stat-
ute under review may have been used most frequently in derivative
suits, it could be applied in any suit against a non-resident. 90  Thus,
the majority concluded, the sequestration statute was not designed to
protect Delaware's interest in securing jurisdiction over corporate
fiduciaries. 91 The Court did not consider the state's interest to be
strong enough to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants having such minimal contacts with the forum. It did not,
however, discuss the factors which led it to conclude that Delaware's
interest in the litigation was not substantial.
Contrary to the decision of the majority, Justice Brennan concluded
that Delaware could assert jurisdiction over the appellants on the
basis of the state's strong interest in controlling the activities of cor-
porate fiduciaries. 92  From this perspective, the contacts of the de-
fendants with the forum were more than minimal; they were both
purposeful and direct. The contacts he considered included Dela-
ware's significant interest in overseeing the affairs of an entity created
under its laws, 93 the appellants' voluntary association with the forum
as a result of their entering into a long term relationship with one of
its domestic corporations, 94 their voluntary- assumption of powers
wholly derived from Delaware's rules and regulations, 95 their willing-
ness to receive those benefits that Delaware law makes available to its
corporations' officials, 96 and the probability that Delaware law would
89. Id. at 2585.
90. Id.; see, e.g., U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976) (breach of con-
tract); Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 290 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1972) (breach of
contract).
91. 97 S. Ct. at 2585-86.
92. Id. at 2589.
93. Id. at 2590. See Gordon v. Iichel, 297 A.2d 420 (Del. Ch. 1972) where the court held:
There is, indeed, a particular valid governmental interest in compelling appearance
in a derivative suit in this jurisdiction because the corporation is organized here, an
action can always be brought here for its benefit and the regulation of its internal
affairs is governed by Delaware law.
297 A.2d at 422.
94. 97 S. Ct. at 2592.
95. Id.
96. Id. These benefits include interest-free loans, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 143 (1974), and
indemnification, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 145 (1974).
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govern in a conflict of laws situation.9 7 Jurisdiction could nqt be de-
nied, Justice Brennan felt, merely because the defendants were never
in Delaware and no act related to the cause of action was committed
in the forum because jurisdiction can be based strictly on out-of-state
acts having foreseeable effects in the forum state. 98
The factors Justice Brennan deems crucial to a minimum contacts
analysis differ noticeably from those held to be important by the
majority. These differences are indicative of the problems that may
arise because of the majority's failure to indicate the criteria to be
used in other situations. Under different circumstances, lower courts
are likely to consider different factors to be controlling when deter-
mining whether they can properly exercise jurisdiction over non-resi-
dents. Two recent cases, decided subsequently to Shaffer, illustrate
this point.
In re Rinderknecht 99 was a marital dissolution action brought in In-
diana. The plaintiff was a resident of Indiana, and the defendant was
a domiciliary of Nebraska.' 00 The marital dissolution proceeding
consisted of two different actions: the changing of the marital status of
the parties; and the adjudication of the incidences of marriage. 10 1
Actions to change the status of the parties had traditionally been in
rem proceedings, 10 2 the res being the marital status itself.10 3 Juris-
diction was founded solely on the State's power to determine the
marital status of its domiciliaries. 10 4 To adjudicate the incidences of
a marriage, however, the court needed to secure personal jurisdiction
over both parties, because it was their personal rights that were being
litigated. 105
Under Shaffer, the Rinderknecht court noted, the minimum con-
tacts test is to be applied to all proceedings, whether in personam or
97. 97 S. Ct. at 2591 n.3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971)
(important considerations include the expectations of the parties and the fairness of governing
the acts and behavior of the parties by rules of conduct created by the specified jurisdiction).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 309 (1971).
98. 97 S. Ct. at 2591. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971).
99. 367 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
100. The terms resident and domiciliary were used interchangeably by the court. Id. at 1133.
101. Id.
102. Lister v. Lister, 86 N.J. Eq. 30, 35, 97 A. 170, 173 (1915).
103. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942).
104. The residency of the plaintiff, without anything more, had consistently been held to be
sufficient to enable a state court to change the marital status of the parties, the court noted. 367
N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). See also Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 547 (1948);
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942).
105. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948).
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in rem, to determine if jurisdiction was asserted properly. 10 6 It
reasoned, however, that since two different types of actions were in-
volved in the dissolution proceedings, two levels of minimum contacts
could be used to satisfy the requirements of the International Shoe
standard. 10 7 In the action to change the status of the parties, the
court held that jurisdiction could be sustained when one party to the
marriage was a resident of the forum. It believed that this contact was
sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts standard because of the
great interest each state has in regulating the marital status of its
residents.' 08 To obtain jurisdiction to adjudicate the incidences of
marriage, however, required "something more," because the state's
interests in this area were not nearly as strong. In order to sustain
jurisdiction over the defendant in the second action, the court con-
cluded, the requirements of the Indiana long-arm statute must be
met.109 These requirements were held not to have been satisfied,
and jurisdiction to adjudicate the incidences of the marriage was de-
nied.
The parties in Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex 110were in-
volved in a breach of contract suit in New York. The plaintiff, a North
Carolina company, initiated an attachment action in California. It
sought to attach a debt owed by a California company to the defend-
ant, a French corporation, as security for the judgment being sought
in the contract action. Uranex had no other assets in the United
States, and without the attachment, would have transferred the
California funds out of the country. Attachment actions, when used in
this manner, ordinarily had been quasi-in rem proceedings."' The
court recognized, though, that Shaffer "has abrogated quasi in rem
jurisdiction as a separate and insular conceptual category." 112 The
106. 367 N.E.2d 1128, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
107. Id. at 1135-36.
108. The court reasoned that:
In light of the great interest which each state has in the marital status of its own
residents and domiciliaries we hold that, although the test for obtaining jurisdiction
to change the status of married persons is now the minimum contacts test, the
residency of one of the parties to the marriage is sufficient to meet that test. The
changing of marital status in a dissolution proceeding is one of those in rein actions
which, according to Shaffer at page 2582, 'would not be affected by a holding that




110. 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1977).
111. Attachment actions and other garnishment-type procedures can be used as a jurisdic-
tional device, Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), or as a provisional remedy, Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
112. 46 U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1977).
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limited contacts of the defendant with the forum, the court noted,
were not sufficient to sustain the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion. 113 Nevertheless, it held that jurisdiction for the purpose of is-
suing a writ of attachment could be validly asserted. In reaching its
conclusion, the court considered "both the jeopardy to plaintiff's ul-
timate recovery and the limited nature of the jurisdiction sought." 114
It reasoned that standards of "fair play and substantial justice" would
not be violated because jurisdiction was solely "to order the attach-
ment and not to adjudicate the underlying merits of the contro-
versies." 115 The court found that the presence of the defendant's
property in California was not fortuitous,, and that the attaching
jurisdiction was not an inconvenient forum for litigation of the limited
issues involved in an attachment action. 1 16 Thus, the court con-
cluded, jurisdiction could be sustained in accordance with Shaffer v.
Heitner. 117
Jurisdiction was held to be proper in both Carolina Power & Light
Co. v. Uranex and In Re Rinderknecht in what were formerly in rem
or quasi-in rem actions. Although neither defendant had significant
contacts with the forum, each court concluded that the state's inter-
est was strong enough to allow jurisdiction to be asserted. The hold-
ings in these cases correspond more closely to the opinion of Justice
Brennan than to the majority decision. The problems are apparent. If
the lower courts are to be able to act with confidence when perform-
ing an analysis of contacts in quasi-in rem and in rem situations, the
Supreme Court must set out in further decisions what it feels are the
pertinent criteria for evaluating such contacts.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the view of Justice Holmes in McDonald v. Mabee 118 that
the "foundation of jurisdiction is physical power" 119 is no longer vi-
able. The Supreme Court no longer accepts the fiction that an asser-
tion of jurisdiction over property is something other than an assertion




116. In holding that California would not be an inconvenient forum for Uranex to litigate the
attachment action, the court found it important that "the French defendant had agreed to liti-
gate in California any disputes that might arise in its dealings with the California corporation."
id.
117. Id.
118. 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
119. Id. at 91.
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of this fiction, it concluded, would be "without substantial m6dern
justification." 120
There can be no doubt that Shaffer v. Heitner signifies the end of
quasi-in rem jurisdiction. While the traditional concept of in rein
jurisdiction appears in theory to have been made obsolete by this
decision, state court jurisdiction based primarily on property located
within the forum, when interests in the property itself are the bases
for the litigation, may be permitted. Jurisdiction will be based on the
contacts of the parties with that property, though, and not on the
actual presence of the property in the state. The Court, however, did
not determine with any certainty the criteria the lower courts should
apply when evaluating the nature and quality of a non-resident de-
fendant's contacts with his property in the forum. Because these con-
tacts were not evaluated when jurisdiction was based on an in rein or
quasi-in rem theory, the appropriate criteria for evaluating them must
be established in future decisions.
Despite these uncertainties, the Shaffer holding is a necessary and
long overdue change in the law of jurisdiction. When an individual
does not have sufficient contacts with a forum to sustain an exercise of
in personam jurisdiction, he should not be compelled to subject his
interests in property located in that state to litigation simply because
he owned property there. When jurisdiction is based solely on for-
tuitous circumstances, and an individual must either subject himself
to the general jurisdiction of the court or face loss of his property
within the forum, "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice" 121 are offended. The use of in rem and quasi-in rem jurisdiction
in situations where in personam jurisdiction could not be justified
circumvented the meaning and intent of International Shoe that fair-
ness to the parties is essential to any jurisdictional analysis if due
process is to be satisfied. 122 The Shaffer decision recognizes that
personal rights are really being adjudicated in these situations. It
concludes that if the spirit of International Shoe is to be preserved,
the standard required to sustain jurisdiction to decide personal rights
must be the same, regardless of whether the action is in personam, in
rem or quasi-in rem.
John A. Rupp
120. 97 S. Ct. at 2584.
121. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
122. See Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1132, 1135 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring); Traynor, supra note 34, at 661.
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